Runway congestion: the inescapable math.
You may recall this interesting item from October — one I found via James Fallows’s blog — in which an airline pilot explained some of the irreducible realities of commercial air traffic:
The pilot, Patrick Smith, pointed out how airports are overloaded with flights by smaller regional jets rather than larger airliners. The smaller planes carry fewer passengers each, so that a given airline needs more planes to carry the same number of passengers. They do this because more planes allows more different flights per day, which suits consumer preferences for (a) more choice in departure time and (b) more direct flights. The trouble is, smaller planes take up a slot of runway time just like larger planes do.
Which leads us to this dynamic:
- Airlines want to offer more flights, and
- Consumers want the choice of more flights, yet
- Runway clearances — the amount of flights per hour — are inflexible, as they should be given the dictates of safety.
The technical and safety aspects of that last point were driven home to me (in terms that this layperson can understand) when I read this great post via another Fallows-supplied link:
The post’s author, Don Brown, was an air-traffic controller for many years, and from all I can tell he knows very well whereof he speaks. He comes down hard in favor of pursuing air safety rather than rewarding airlines’ commercial mandates, which currently, according to Brown, extend to being “allowed to schedule more flights than the runways can handle in even perfect weather.”
It’s clear from reading the piece that Brown understands the huge pressures on airlines to offer more flights and to fly them on time. And he understands why they don’t limit their flights, even in the name of safety.
Airlines can make more money selling 70 airplanes worth of tickets per hour than they could if they limited themselves to the 60 airplanes per hour that the runway can handle. In fairness to the airlines, it’s not in their interest to limit themselves. It is easier to sell the tickets and blame the delays on the weather or the “antiquated†air traffic control system. Especially if the flying public doesn’t understand runway capacity limits and therefore fails to notice that the “antiquated†air traffic control system is delivering more airplanes to the runways than the runways can handle.
As Brown ably explains, those runway limitations aren’t subject to much tinkering, and they’ll hardly be solved by the much-discussed NextGen air-traffic control system, which is still on the FAA’s drawing board. Why? Because airports — especially horribly clogged ones like JFK in New York — are already at maximum runway capacity.
The math is as simple as it is inescapable. Roughly 60 airliners can use a runway in one hour if conditions are absolutely perfect. It is physically impossible to improve that number. However, it can get a lot worse.
Brown is right when he calls the current disconnect over runway capacity “madness.” The problem, as I see it, is that the interested parties each look at only a part of the issue — the part that affects their desires, naturally — without acknowledging the inherent contradictions in their views.
Consumers want more flights, more direct flights, and consistent on-time departures. Of course, we also tend to want sexy spouses, lucrative-yet-easy careers, and, often, chocolate-chip cookies when we’re feeling blue. But we don’t usually act like we’re automatically entitled to get these things, unlike on-time departures and six direct flights daily from Austin to Columbus.
To the degree that they can, airlines respond to these consumer desires, even when it means they cut corners on customer service, because experience tells them that travelers will choose flights primarily based on the convenience of the itinerary and the price of the ticket, not on how nice the gate agents or telephone operators are.
Meantime, Brown wants safety above all. To get it, he thinks that federal action is required:
Congress should pass legislation mandating that each commercial airport’s maximum hourly capacity be established and published. Furthermore, the FAA should impose limitations on the number of flights that can be scheduled at each commercial airport. That number should be less than the maximum capacity, taking into account such factors as typical weather patterns for the airport, routine maintenance and any other factor that typically limits capacity.
There are plenty of areas where I’m wary about regulation, which often arises from a good idea but then collapses under the weight of bureaucracy. But there are cases in which the federal government is the only entity that can address all parts of a problem. This is one of them.
For all my railing against them, airlines aren’t wicked. But all sorts of un-wicked businesses will do ill-advised things in their non-stop search for profits. Hey, that’s capitalism, and for the most part I’m glad to take it. But there’s a reason our arch-capitalist society has evolved sophisticated regulatory regimes over time, namely because over time we’ve come to realize that other considerations besides profit ought to come first, at least for certain things. Don Brown has hit on a very good example.
Category: Transportation5 Comments so far
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Excellent analysis, Tim. Thanks for taking the comment about the airlines and their schedules correctly (some haven’t.) They are simply chasing their profits. That is what a business must do. It isn’t “good” or “bad” from a business perspective — it’s simply a matter of survival.
The “good” and “bad” is for us — the citizens — to determine.
I don’t have any illusions about the process though. I know the airlines will be first in line to lobby Congress against any slot restrictions.
Thanks for reading.
Don Brown
http://gettheflick.blogspot.com/
Why does it take 60 seconds for a plane to slow from 180 mph (80 m/s) to zero? Keep the thrust reversers on longer and get off the runway in 30 seconds or less. Fog or no fog, with GPS, radar, accelerometers, etc, aircraft should be able to maintain a precise acceleration and speed profile at all times (tire blowouts and extreme weather aside), locate the taxiway, and keep takeoff and landing slot times to the second.
As for wake turbulence, can aircraft use alternate takeoff directions to avoid each other’s wake? Eg. plane A banks to the left after takeoff, then plane B banks to the right, etc.
And keep service vehicles out of the way.
Airlines with excessive mechanical failures should be assigned lower priority for landing slots.
Perhaps by taking advantage of existing technology and imposing strict military discipline and precision on airport and aircraft operations, we can fit more planes in, and leave spare slots for emergency landings.
Don — Thanks for the kind words. You’ve put the responsibility where it belongs.
Joe C. — I’m hardly the air-traffic expert in this conversation, but it seems that you’re making a lot of assumptions in your comment that might not be true. E.g. you talk about “imposing strict military discipline and precision” as though that’s not *already* happening. From reading Don’s work (and Don *is* the air-traffic expert in this conversation), it seems to me that *most* runways at most airports already operate the way you describe. The state of the art for aviation knowledge (i.e. all our engineering expertise, plus lessons learned from hard experience, and so on) tells us that *nobody* can reliably get airliners on and off the runways at less than one per minute. And it’s easy to *say* “for or no fog” and so on, but it seems to me that it would be quite a bit different to *do* this when you’re steering an airliner that weighs 50 or 60 tons … on wet tarmac … with scores of passengers’ safety riding on your actions.
Also, your comment misses a larger point: *somewhere* down the line, even if we had absolutely perfect robot pilots who could land an overloaded 747 on a suburban cul-de-sac in a driving snowstorm — SOMEWHERE, I say, we’re going to run into the upper limits of what’s possible. Maybe that means 70 or 80 landings per hour, instead of 60. But without the regulatory measures Don proposes, the airlines will *still* tend to overload the runways. They’ll just do it at a higher level.
So it’s not about an incremental improvement in how fast planes get off the runways. It’s about accounting for the current incentives (to make money) and the disincentives (to lower the number of flights) that affect the airlines as they seek out maximal profits.
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